desmosthenes@lemmy.world
on 01 Feb 2024 16:37
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hope for the best; plan for the worst
redcalcium@lemmy.institute
on 01 Feb 2024 17:14
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This advisory will be edited with more details on 2024/02/15, when admins have been given some time to update, as we think any amount of detail would make it very easy to come up with an exploit.
But the commit to fix insufficient origin validation is already visible right there in the repo?
pelespirit@sh.itjust.works
on 01 Feb 2024 17:20
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Could you explain what you’re saying in common language?
cypherpunks@lemmy.ml
on 01 Feb 2024 17:27
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The lack of details in the advisory is only a minor impediment for a malicious person who wants to figure out how to implement their own exploit for this vulnerability. Anyone can read the patch that fixes it and figure it out.
TLDR: if you run your own instance, update it ASAP. If an instance you rely on hasn’t updated yet, consider asking its admins to do so. And if they don’t update it soon, you might want to reconsider your choice of instance.
elvith@feddit.de
on 01 Feb 2024 19:31
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And if they don’t update it soon, you might want to reconsider your choice of instance.
The advisory went up about 4h ago. About 3h ago, my instance admin sent out an announcement that the patch had been applied. That was before I even heard about the issue.
cheviotveneer@sh.itjust.works
on 02 Feb 2024 23:17
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private repo they commit to and build from
This isn’t possible with Ruby and Mastodon. The only way to distribute the patch is to reveal the changes to the source. FWIW, compiling the fix is still just an obfuscation method, one can still just diff the binaries and see what changed (see: reverse-engineering Windows vulnerabilities in updates).
At best, you can release it with a bunch of unrelated and obfuscating changes, but putting work into doing that is further delaying simply getting the fix released.
threaded - newest
hope for the best; plan for the worst
But the commit to fix insufficient origin validation is already visible right there in the repo?
Could you explain what you’re saying in common language?
The lack of details in the advisory is only a minor impediment for a malicious person who wants to figure out how to implement their own exploit for this vulnerability. Anyone can read the patch that fixes it and figure it out.
TLDR: if you run your own instance, update it ASAP. If an instance you rely on hasn’t updated yet, consider asking its admins to do so. And if they don’t update it soon, you might want to reconsider your choice of instance.
The advisory went up about 4h ago. About 3h ago, my instance admin sent out an announcement that the patch had been applied. That was before I even heard about the issue.
Nice work :)
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Without a published POC there's a slightly longer window before clueless script kiddies start having a go at exploiting the vulnerability, though.
Script kiddies aren’t the first ones to take advantage of vulns, threat actors are.
That doesn’t mean you shouldn’t try to contain the blast radius.
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This isn’t possible with Ruby and Mastodon. The only way to distribute the patch is to reveal the changes to the source. FWIW, compiling the fix is still just an obfuscation method, one can still just diff the binaries and see what changed (see: reverse-engineering Windows vulnerabilities in updates).
At best, you can release it with a bunch of unrelated and obfuscating changes, but putting work into doing that is further delaying simply getting the fix released.
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@cypherpunks Upgrading went smoothly.
Hmm, so if one is on iOS, the current version 2023.16, and is vulnerable. Take note apple / mac folx.
No, this is a server-side vulnerability. Clients do not need to update, instances do.
TY!
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